Hi tnladydi!

Thanks for posting.

First off, you mention "semantics" and I'm not totally sure if you're talking about "general semantics." I'll just assume you are.

I would agree with the perspective that from a general semantics perspective, we aim to clarify our messages by looking at how we communicate our messages. That is, we look at the words we use and consider them "important" in communicating our messages.

From a general semantics perspective (in particular, a korzybskian perspective), there is a difference between the two statements:

"What you intend to do would be unethical."
"You are unethical."

There are a number of ways to differentiate the sentences, but in general semantics we might note that the strucutures implied by each statement are different.

In "You are unethical," the speaker invokes what we call "the is of predication." This be-verb tends to project qualities onto things ("You") which structurally speaking are, well, projections another person makes onto things and not "reality." Better ways to say this from a general semantics, structurally more sound perspective might be "You behave unethically," "You seem unethical," "You act unethically," "You do not abide by this ethic," "You do not abide by this code of ethics," etc. Essentially, you get rid of the is of predication and replace it with something more structurally sound--that is, with a more empirically accurate statement.

In "What you intend to do would be unethical," I hear a speaker saying something more like this: "I would label what you intend to do, if you do it, 'unethical.'" That is, here the speaker is laying the groundrules by which he would apply a particular term--in this instance, the term "unethical." It is a rather linguistically-minded speaker in this statement, at least compared to the speaker of the first statement.

There is a possibility that this person would not project unethicalness onto the other person and would note that it's merely a label, but not knowing a fuller scenario, it's tough to say. Both might project unethicalness onto the other as if it were an empirical, factual characteristic, in which case general semantics would object.

I hope that helps.

Ben

Hi tnladydi,

"What you intend to do would be unethical" and "You are unethical." Does the latter "infer" the former? I would really appreciate anyone's response.

Adding to Ben's comments.
No. The latter (words) do not infer the former--But someone might infer the latter from the former.

Another way you might rephrase the first sentence: From my values, and standards, and if I understand- interpret your intention correctly, I consider what you intend to do an example of "unethical behaviour". (Whenever we disagree or criticize another, we are in effect matching/ measuring, their 'behavior', to/against our standards, values, expectations, and so on.)

Saying "You are unethical", interpreted from one general semantics perspective, would be tantamount to saying that your brother is always unethical, and that this one instance 'makes' him an unethical person. If you looked closely at your brother, I doubt you would see "unethical" anywhere. I doubt if there is anyone--even the meanest person, who always behaves unethically.

Please say if what you understand of the above helps to any degree.

Milton

In the first place, it might help to distinguish implication from inference. The speaker/writer implies (or suggests) various connotations by his/her choice of words. The listener/reader infers (or assumes) various connotations from what he/she makes of the words others use. In the case of the original question, since the character judgment: "You are unethical" (by your very nature) indicts you for past unethical behavior and predicts nothing but the same from you in the future, then it certainly implies (not infers) the former sentence. The opposite, however, does not hold true. You might do something unethical at some point in your life, but that does not make you "unethical" in all that you say and do thereafter and forever. Again, the second sentence implies the first but the first sentence does not imply the second.

A further distinction might help, as well: namely, that "semantics" refers to the study of meaning in general, whereas the proper name, General Semantics, indicates a specific approach to investigating and influencing language behavior originated by Alfred Korzybski in the 1930s. As to clarity of meaning, General Semantics aims to adopt the scientific ethos of impartiality which requires precision and transparency, whereas the everyday, rhetorical use of "semantics" freely admits of veiled and opaque purposes assiduously pursued through deliberate obfuscation. In other words: "A truth that's told with bad intent beats all the lies you can invent." I once heard someone say that the greatest salesmen and propagandists in the world know their General Semantics (or its equivalent) quite well -- they just have no use for its attendant ethics of fairness. Unfortunately, the word "semantics" has long since become merely a colloquial epithet for hair-splitting, nit-picking irrelevancy, and I fear that some of that tar has rubbed off the brush onto Korzybski's General Semantics, as well. Too bad.

At any rate, I recommend paraphrasing prospective sentences without the use of the judgmental-and-stereotyping "is," "am," "are," etc. Try to discover what the sentences mean, not just what they appear to say. Who says things? Where do they say them? When do they say them? For whom do they say them? For what purpose do they say them? So, for example:

"I need some advice about an ongoing debate with my brother over the meaning of the following two sentences:

(1) 'Personally, I consider your intended behavior unethical.'
(2) 'People might brand you as unethical for the rest of your life.'

Does the second sentence imply the first, and/or the other way around?

Wait a minute! I may just have answered my own question."

A great many pseudo-questions disappear once the attention shifts from what "is" to how, when, where, why, and for whom one specific behavior relates to another.

Just my two cents worth of General Semantics.

Hi Michael,

You wrote:

"semantics" refers to the study of meaning in general, whereas the proper name, General Semantics, indicates a specific approach to investigating and influencing language behavior originated by Alfred Korzybski in the 1930s.

I disagree with your explanation of what GS indicates, as I consider it a very limiting description. GS deals with far more than language, and to miss seeing that is to miss a lot of the value that AK provided. In the newly published 'Korzybski: A Biography', Bruce Kodish goes into this confusion in considerable detail. Here's an excerpt:

But the term ‘semantic(s)’ had so much historical baggage related to linguistic meanings, the history of words, etc., that many people would find it hard to put that aside in considering Korzybski’s use of semantic reaction and general semantics. As a result, the principle of least effort tended to operate. Many people, supporters and critics alike, would confuse Korzybski’s work with the more elementalistic studies of verbal and philosophical "semantics".

[...]

Nonetheless, in the book, he had made it abundantly clear that any s.r, i.e., semantic (evaluational) reaction, constituted an un-speakable, psycho-logical response to an event with “a number of aspects, an ‘affective’, and an ‘intellectual’, a physiological, a colloidal, and what not.” It was not words, although any response to words or symbolism necessarily involved s.r. [Korzybski: A Biography, Pg 343]

To appreciate the subtle—yet fundamentally important—nature of this confusion, consider that even some of the more 'well-known' writers in the field of GS like Hayakawa were apparently laboring under this misunderstanding in spite of AK's repeated attempts to correct them. In your introduction you mentioned that your initial contact with GS came through Hayakawa's book, and that pre-conditioning may have something to do with the way you described GS in your post above.

The structure of a representation could radically change what got expressed. Korzybski had long warned his students about the dangers of translating the non-aristotelian system into the old elementalistic distinctions and terminology. To a significant extent, Hayakawa had so far—and would continue—to do exactly that. Korzybski had advised speaking in terms of “evaluation.” But in Language in Action, Hayakawa continued to talk about ‘meaning’ without quotes (easier to forget about a ‘meaning-maker’). [Korzybski: A Biography, Pg 514]

And so on and so forth. I highly recommend Dr. Kodish's book for an introduction to these various subtle but important aspects of understanding GS, which I think can be more accurately considered of as 'applied epistemology.' If this is indeed an important misunderstanding then we should do what we can to stop its further propagation.

Warmly,

Nava-yauvana dās

Hi Michael,

You wrote:

"semantics" refers to the study of meaning in general, whereas the proper name, General Semantics, indicates a specific approach to investigating and influencing language behavior originated by Alfred Korzybski in the 1930s.

I disagree with your explanation of what GS indicates, as I consider it a very limiting description. GS deals with far more than language, and to miss seeing that is to miss a lot of the value that AK provided. In the newly published 'Korzybski: A Biography', Bruce Kodish goes into this confusion in considerable detail. Here's an excerpt:

But the term ‘semantic(s)’ had so much historical baggage related to linguistic meanings, the history of words, etc., that many people would find it hard to put that aside in considering Korzybski’s use of semantic reaction and general semantics. As a result, the principle of least effort tended to operate. Many people, supporters and critics alike, would confuse Korzybski’s work with the more elementalistic studies of verbal and philosophical "semantics".

[...]

Nonetheless, in the book, he had made it abundantly clear that any s.r, i.e., semantic (evaluational) reaction, constituted an un-speakable, psycho-logical response to an event with “a number of aspects, an ‘affective’, and an ‘intellectual’, a physiological, a colloidal, and what not.” It was not words, although any response to words or symbolism necessarily involved s.r. [Korzybski: A Biography, Pg 343]

To appreciate the subtle—yet fundamentally important—nature of this confusion, consider that even some of the more 'well-known' writers in the field of GS like Hayakawa were apparently laboring under this misunderstanding in spite of AK's repeated attempts to correct them. In your introduction you mentioned that your initial contact with GS came through Hayakawa's book, and that pre-conditioning may have something to do with the way you described GS in your post above.

[quote]The structure of a representation could radically change what got expressed. Korzybski had long warned his students about the dangers of translating the non-aristotelian system into the old elementalistic distinctions and terminology. To a significant extent, Hayakawa had

Hello, navayauvana. Thank you for your comments.

I agree that I gave a very limited (but still accurate enough) explanation of some -- but not all -- differences one could find between a common name like "semantics" versus a specific, proper name like General Semantics. Alfred Korzybski wrote a huge book on the specific subject, and I had no intention of trying to cram a great of that verbiage into a few brief sentences. On the other hand, I had thought that the biological and psychological term "behavior" in the phrase "investigating and influencing language behavior" made my reference to both verbal and non-verbal signaling clear enough. I use General Semantics principles and practices -- and a good many Yogic ones -- to investigate and influence my own psychological/physiological/linguistic behaviors and although I had thought about using some of Korzybski's technical terms like "organism as a whole in an environment," "signal reaction," "semantic reaction" (which we can educate and train), etc., I considered these too specific and unnecessary for my introductory comments. The original poster in this thread seemed to have enough difficulty with basic concepts like implication versus inference.

Korzybski did take issue with later editions of Hayakawa's "Abstraction Ladder" -- considering them an oversimplification of the Structural Differential -- but in the original Language in Action (1939), Hayakawa used the Structural Differential, only upside down so that "higher" level abstractions would appear at the top of the page with the "unspoken," process-level of reality at the bottom. In the footnote to the page on which this illustration occurs, Hayakawa notes that Korzybski gave his kind permission for the adaptation. In later editions of his classic introduction to General Semantics, Hayakawa further simplified his Abstraction Ladder because a great many people in Korzybski and Hayakawa's time (if not later) considered Korzybski's patented device some kind of weird and suspicious "gadget" or Rube Goldberg "contraption." To overcome this native prejudice against such strange-looking visual aides, Hayakawa made the adjustments that he and his editors considered reasonable. They did what they thought necessary to communicate the basic idea. I can't say as how I blame them.

Furthermore, as D. David Bourland, Jr. significantly noted, some readers of Science and Sanity questioned why Korzybski went on using the "is" of identity and the "is" of predication even after he so vociferously "rejected" them. To many readers, this struck them as: "Do as I say, and not as I do." Can't say as how I blame them.

After reading Alfred Korzybski several times, I went on to read other sources that he had quoted, like pioneers in semantics Charles Sanders Peirce and I. A. Richards. Many people other than Alfred Korzybski have had important things to say about how people form, adapt, or replace ineffective and maladaptive behavioral habits. Among general semanticists, I have found clinical psychologist Wendell Johnson closest to the mark. After all, Korzybski first began his work leading to General Semantics working with psychologically traumatized veterans of the Great War (later renamed World War I). Changing language behavior changes the neurological structure of the brain which also affects glandular, skeletal, muscular, and immunological systems of the body -- the organism as a whole in an environment. Language behavior does not just mean "words," and I did not think that I said or implied that. If you inferred any such thing, then I regret that.

Hi Michael,

When you wrote "investigating and influencing language behavior" the red flag that went off for me was your term "language behavior." If you did not mean to restrict the meaning to language, then why modify "behavior" with the word "language"? Why not drop the "language" modifier? Or why not use AK's preferred non-elementalistic term, "evaluation", which anyone can understanding without being overwhelmed by jargon? Evaluation takes place even on the silent levels, without "language behavior" entering into the picture at all.

Furthermore, if we are communicating to the original poster who seems unfamiliar with the subject matter of GS, it would be unreasonable to think they would understand "language behavior" as including neurological processes, etc. That would not be consistent with our assumption of their unfamiliarity with GS and its associated terminology.

Therefore I think it not unreasonable to expect that someone reading your definition would be (mis)led to limit GS to the context of language or words.

I understand that you may well be using GS differently from what I inferred you meant in your writing. I jumped into this conversation just to shout out that there IS an issue like this to watch out for, for the benefit of anyone who may casually browse through this thread. So if I make a big enough fuss about it, a newcomer to GS would at least keep this in mind when studying AK's works.

Regarding AK's permission for Hayakawa's modification of the SD, I got a different picture from the biography. Here's an excerpt:

He described part of the problem in a May 24 letter to Robert Lee Durham, President of the Southern Seminary and Junior College in Buena Vista, Virginia:

"You know from Science and Sanity the structural differential. On top there is the event, then comes the ‘object’, and then follow higher and higher order abstractions. On a printed page the ‘higher’ go ‘down’. A great many students are somehow confused because higher and higher abstractions in a diagram go physically lower and lower on a printed page. In the lithographed edition [1939] of Hayakawa’s Language in Action the differential was given the way it was in Science and Sanity, from the top of the page down, which was correct. He was pestered by his students on this subject. Somehow he did not know the answer, so in the printed text edition of his book on page 96 he turned around the differential and put in print: ‘Start reading from bottom UP’. Why in the dickens then do it, when normally you read from up down? The answer is the unconscious assumption trained in us in a pre-scientific orientation; namely that the earth is flat and so 'up' and 'down' have absolute value, while on a spherical earth they have only relative value."

In the later editions of his book, Hayakawa had further compounded the problem of reversing the Structural Differential by renaming it “The Abstraction Ladder,” a metaphor that reified the unconscious assumption of absolute ‘up’ and ‘down’ and obscured the process aspect of abstracting. Hayakawa’s ladder metaphor effectively eliminated the circularity of human knowledge, the important connection between the highest and lowest levels in the process. In subsequent editions of the book, Hayakawa even used a picture of a ladder with a little man seemingly stranded at the top. [Korzybski: A Biography, Pg 513]

I can't say as how I blame Korzybski for being cross at Hayakawa.

Representation has tremendous power to affect our evaluation. After all, if someone had told Einstein that it was too weird to represent the world as 4-dimensional space-time and it would be 'better' to separate space and time because it would be easier for people to understand, we would have missed the tremendous insights to be gained from the new representation. I think popularity is not a factor to consider in accurate communication of a complex subject.

And now I think I've made enough noise about this.

Warmly,

Nava-yauvana dās

Hi Nava-yauvana das,

Well put.

Re. "is": I imagine Science And Sanity would have been much more difficult to read for many if Korzybski had written it consistently applying general semantics principles in formulating every sentence. Over 75 years after, in making the effort to do this in my article on "Advanced Thinking" the essay was criticized as "much too verbose, repetitive, stylistic and an attempt to be all-inclusive". I imagine the essay was critiqued, and editorialized from a familiar grammatical Aristotelian and grammatical frame of reference. And I also imagine that "Science And Sanity" will be read by some in that way--at least initially. This seems to me unavoidable when we are dealing with words in a book: They are likely to be interpreted from the more familiar ways of thinking and interpreting--even when the writer cautions: "Don't do that. You will miss the message." ('The Institute' (starting with Korzybski) recognizing this, gave seminar-workshops for many years to help students develop a deeper feel, understanding, and practice of the system through connecting words (principles) to experience.)

BTW. Many "is" of identity can be converted to "is"of existence. You might discover there is some truth to this.

Milton

Hello, Milton. Thank you for joining the discussion, but I disagree with you about the difficulty of reading and understanding sentences "formulated" -- i.e., constructed -- in the non-Aristotlean language that Korzybski preached about but did not practice. In truth, sentences intentionally constructed in an "Is"-less grammar typically contain fewer words, no passive voice, more active and vivid verbs, no place-holder expletive constructions ("It is," "there is," "there are," etc.) and far less identification and unconscious projection. With a little applied effort, any reasonably intelligent person can construct (I mean, "formulate") clear, meaningful sentences without any of the "be"-fuddled constructions that only reinforce and propagate prescientific, Aristotlean habits. I cannot believe that you had the slightest difficulty reading and understanding what I've just written.

When I first read Korzybski, Hayakawa, Johnson, and Rapoport -- decades ago -- I did not realize -- as I do now -- now much wasted time and energy goes into degassing and paraphrasing their "be"-bloated sentences. Monstrosities like "It is to be understood [by you] that ..." instead of the simpler "understand that ..." came to annoy me at the needless waste of my attention. I began to associate such sentences with Tweedledee, who insanely babbled: "If it was so, it might be; and if it were so, it would be; but as it isn't, it ain't. That's logic." Lewis Carroll effectively exploded "A is A" Aristotlean "logic" long before Korzybski got around to "saying" that he wanted to eliminate it, too. I think that a lot of reasonable people have unfortunately dismissed General Semantics as a Korzybski cult precisely because they hear people spouting opaque jargon and talking about something instead of actually doing it. I used to give Korzybski some slack because he didn't speak English as his native language. but as I've aged and started running out of life to waste, I have grown less charitable towards others who ought to -- and can -- know better. As George Orwell wrote:

" ... modern writing at its worst does not consist in picking out words for the sake of their meaning and inventing images in order to make the meaning clearer. It consists in gumming together long strips of words which have already been set in order by someone else, and making the results presentable by sheer humbug."

Long ago, someone else set the animistic structure of our language in place. It makes no sense now to go on perpetuating "presentable humbug" out of little more than laziness and semantic inertia. As F. C. S. Schiller said about "being"-based Aristotlean logic: "Nothing has a greater hold on the human mind than nonsense fortified by technicality." Personally, I do not wish to let ancient animistic sentence structures do my thinking for me. So I do a little delaying so that I can do some evaluating of possible options so that I can educate my semantic reaction and so reject identification and unconscious projection to the greatest extent possible.

I feel confidant that you did not have any trouble reading each and every one of my deliberately formulated sentences and I do not think anyone would have had trouble reading Korzybski's ideas, either, had he actually formulated them in a more concise and easily-understood manner.

As for the "is" of existence, well, we have this word called "existence." I recommend using it. If we think that something exists, we can simply say: "Something exists." No need to mystify things by introducing animistic metaphysics into the picture. I agree with Bertrand Russell that Aristotle's "prime mover itself unmoved" (namely, "being") constitutes a difficult, if not needless, pseudo-problem. I recommend simply avoiding it and moving on.

Hi Michael,

Prosyletizing?--Understand that something exists as important that you apply whatever you have learned from "Science And Sanity" and other readings? For me: It is not the language, the formulation, literary or grammatical faults, that interest me in anything I read. I do enjoy what (by my standards) I consider excellent formulations. Korzybski, as far as I know, did not set out to contribute to "literature" as usually regarded (although I do value his ideas and principles in terms of potentially 'permanent and universal interest'). I am more interested in studying and applying the principles that I can abstract from however anything is written--no matter how poorly (based on my standards) I think it was written. For instance: It took me a whole week to understand just one chapter on what I imagine Deleuze was thinking about in his "Capitalism and Schizophrenia". From my standards, this could have been formulated in a more concise and easily-understood manner so that I would not have had to 'waste' so much of my time trying to figure out just what he was 'saying'. But then I consoled myself that he was not writing for me. I eventually abstracted the metaphor of the "Rhyzome" and consider this a reward and not really a waste my time.

I am writings, I think I would have difficulties substituting the phrase "something exists" as you propose.