Important Terms 2016-11-03T21:34:47+00:00

What Does That Mean?

As with any field, general semantics has its own specialized terminology.  Some of the terms that commonly appear in general semantics and overviews of their meanings are in alphabetical order below.

Our language ought to reflect what we understand about the world and our experiences in that world, just as a map should be expected to accurately reflect the actual territory it depicts. If we acknowledge the limitations of our abstracting processes, that everything around us is in continual (if imperceptible) change, and that we can never know everything about anything, those limitations ought to be reflected in the language we use. Therefore we find relatively few instances to appropriately use absolutistic terms such as all, never, always, every, exact same, absolutely, exactly, certainly, etc.

Our awareness of an event or happening is not the same as the actual event or happening. Each nervous system abstracts a limited  number of characteristics about an event, from which that individual constructs what she senses and experiences. When she describes or talks about that experience, she continues to abstract by selecting certain aspects and ignoring others. Abstracting refers to this ongoing human process of selecting, rejecting, and constructing our own individual experiences from everything that goes on around us. In other words, what we sense is not the same as what happens, what we can describe is not the same as what we sense, and the significance we give to what happens is more than what we can merely describe.

An ‘allness’ attitude ignores the limitations of our abstracting processes.

If General Semantics can be described in one word, it might be conditionality. To the degree that our reactions and responses to all forms of stimuli are automatic, or conditioned, we copy animals, like Pavlov’s dog. To the degree that our reactions and responses are more controlled, delayed, or conditional to the given situation, we exhibit our uniquely-human capabilities.

The ongoing, continual awareness of our abstracting processes, and limitations, should results in attitudes and behaviors that are more appropriate to the situation.

Assigning dates to observations, events, people, and conclusions helps to remind us that no one ‘thing’ is ever the same twice, that change is continual. For example, Bob Jones(2004) is not the same as Bob Jones(1994), therefore his attitudes toward a particular issue or person might well be different as well.

If we are conscious of our abstracting, and respond conditionally to our experiences, we should naturally be more deliberate in our reactions. Simply put, this is applying the aphorism of “count to ten” before you say or do something you might regret later.

Given the limitations of our abstracting and evaluative processes, we can never “say all” or “know all” … more could always be said. Our knowledge is incomplete, we’ll never have “all the facts,” so it’s important to be aware of the et cetera.

In General Semantics, this term goes hand in hand with abstracting and is used in a much more general sense than conventional usage. In GS, it refers to the human neuro-physiological processes by which we experience, react to, and form judgments about the world around us. These evaluative processes produce our immediate, automatic reactions, as well as our more deliberate responses. They may take the form of behaviors we recognize as ‘thinking’, ‘feeling’, talking, deciding, judging, concluding, interpreting, describing, etc.

When we abstract and evaluate appropriate to the ‘facts’ of the situation, we exhibit a more extensional orientation. When we base our actions and attitudes more on preconceived opinions, ill-considered judgments, or prejudiced assumptions, we exhibit a more intensional orientation. An extensional attitude is one that is more ‘scientific’ (“I don’t know … let’s see!”), grounded in first-order observations with limited conclusions. An intensional attitude is one that is more dogmatic and unwilling to be questioned (“My mind is made up, I don’t care what the facts are.”) An extensional approach is more concerned with ‘facts’ and observations, whereas intensional approaches often rely on verbalizations. As the old aphorism goes, “One test is worth a thousand expert opinions.”

Irving J. Lee (Northwestern University) defined a very high threshold for what he called a ‘fact’: 1)  it must be made after a public observation; 2) it must be confined to the actual observation and not go beyond the observation; and 3) it must be as close to certainty as humanly possible.  Other types of statements that do not meet this high threshold (inferences, assumptions, premises, beliefs, theories, etc.) can be made to sound like facts. But these types of non-facts can be stated with or without actual observations; they can speculate about current or future events; they can go beyond actual events by projecting intention, motivation, cause, etc.; and they involve degrees of probability (or argument). In other words, according to these definitions, ‘facts’ cannot be argued, whereas other types of statements lend themselves to argument and disagreement. Therefore it stands to reason that there is far more risk in treating an inference as if it were fact, rather than treating a ‘fact’ as if it were an inference.

Similar to dating, the technique of indexing serves as a reminder to respect differences, that no two things are identical and that no word has the exact same meaning twice. For examples:  Muslim(1) is not Muslim(2) is not Muslim(3); democracy(here) is not democracy(there).

Perhaps the most critical term used by Korzybski in formulating General Semantics. When we are not aware of our abstracting process, we tend to confuse or identify one order of abstraction with another. Typically, we identify or equate our reactions (descriptions, feelings, thoughts, judgments, etc.) about an event with the event itself,  ignoring the role of our own nervous system in constructing our experience. For example, when we make a simple statement like “the rose is red,” we are projecting ‘red-ness’ as a quality or attribute that exists as a part of the rose. Instead, the ‘red-ness’ is created by the viewer’s own peculiar nervous system interaction with the object, light reflections, etc. Therefore a more accurate statement that avoids this identification would be, “the rose appears red to me.”

In Language in Thought and Action, S.I. Hayakawa introduced the notion of an abstraction ladder. Though often confused with (and even mistakenly credited to) Korzybski’s formulation of the abstracting process, Hayakawa’s ladder metaphor simply depicts the verbal or linguistic process of hierarchical generalization. For example, at the bottom of the ‘ladder’ we can talk about a specific and unique ‘event’ we call “cow.” As we move up the ladder of abstraction, the same “cow” could be labeled as “livestock”, or “farm asset”, or even “wealth.” As the terms move up the ladder, the specific and unique characteristics (differences) are suppressed and similarities to other items or events is emphasized.

Sometimes we use words in ways that are not intended to be literal, but ironic, sarcastic, or facetious. Or we want to flag certain words as “so-called” or that we’re using them in an unconventional or unusual sense. The use of quote marks around such words alerts the reader (or viewer-listener if “air quotes” are used) to be careful in reacting to or evaluating this particular usage.

Another critical term formulated by Korzybski that is often misunderstood; it does not refer to “reactions to words.” Rather, Korzybski employed the term to refer to the total response of an individual to any event, activity, situation, or personal interaction. By “total response” we refer to our thoughts, feelings, behaviors, attitudes, etc.,  from our non-verbal sensory reactions to our cognitive awarenesses.

The Structural Differential

Korzybski created a physical model (later redrawn as a diagram) to illustrate the structural differences between humans and animals in terms of their abilities to abstract; animals are limited in their ability to abstract, whereas humans can continue to infer about inferences indefinitely. The model provides a visual summary of the abstracting process.

Only humans have demonstrated the capability to build on the accumulated knowledge of prior generations. Korzybski referred to this capability as time-binding and declared it as the primary difference between humans and animals. Language and the symbolizing capabilities to record, document, and transmit information serves as the principle tool that facilitates time-binding.

Wendell Johnson in People in Quandaries refers to an attitude of “to-me-ness” as awareness that there is considerable individual variation in the way we sense, experience, react and symbolize. We each experience “what is going on” uniquely, according to our individual sensory capabilities, our past experiences and conditioning. We do well to maintain an attitude of “to-me-ness” in our evaluations of our own behavior, as well as in our evaluations of others’ behavior.

J. Samuel Bois used this phrase to refer to the parabola of Korzybski’s Structural Differential model (the indefinite number of characteristics of a particular event or situation, some of which we may abstract but many of which we cannot).

For information on the 65th Alfred Korzybski Memorial Lecture on the evening of October 27, 2017, click here.
For information on the two-day General Semantics Symposium on October 28-29, 2017, click here.
+ +